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Economic development in Rwanda and Burundi: Two Neighbouring countries, worlds apart 
Rwanda and Burundi, countries situated in the African great lakes region are often called the 
‘false twins of Africa’ (Breackman, 2011). The countries are called this way, because they 
share the same ethnic groups and have both been colonized by Germany and later Belgium. 
Not only do they share the same ethnic and historical aspects, they have both experienced 
violence, genocide and civil wars, because of ethnicity. However, these two small 
neighbouring countries differ immensely when it comes to economic development and how 
they deal with the recognition of ethnicity post-conflict. While both countries have 
completely different approaches how they included or excluded ethnicity in their constitution 
and government policies, Rwanda seems to be doing much better on the economic front than 
Burundi is (Gilbert, 2013, P. 422).         
 A well- known theory that is frequently used as a benchmark to explain economic 
growth, in African countries specifically, is the theory of Easterly and Levine (1997) that they 
have presented in their article, Africa’s growth tragedy: Policies and Ethnic divisions. 
Easterly and Levine argue that the more ethnically diverse a country is, the less a country will 
grow economically. This factor of ethnical diversity is the major cause for Africa’s poor 
economic performance according to Easterly and Levine (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005, P. 
771).           
 Easterly and Levine measure this ethnic diversity as the probability that two randomly 
drawn individuals from one unit of observation, the country, belong to different groups. This 
means that the more ethnic groups can be found in a country, the higher the probability that 
that two randomly drawn individuals belong to different groups, resulting in ethnic diversity. 
This also means that when there is a small number of ethnic groups in a country, the 
probability that two randomly drawn individuals belong to different groups is lower, and 
cannot therefore be called ethnically diverse according to Easterly and Levine (Alesina & La 
Ferrara, 2005, P. 771-772).          
  Rwanda and Burundi share the same limited number of ethnic groups; Hutu, Tutsi and 
Batwa.  According to Easterly and Levine (1997), this would then mean that the probability 
that two randomly drawn individuals belonging to different groups is low and the countries 
can therefore not be called ethnically diverse (CIA World Factbook, 2018ab).  
 A theory that may be more fitting to explain the difference in economic growth 
between these countries, considering that the recognition of ethnicity is incorporated into both 
countries’ institutions, is that of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) that they have presented in 
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their book, Why nations fail. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) namely argue that economic 
growth is associated with the type of institutions present in a country and that economic 
growth usually occurs in countries with inclusive political and economic institutions, while 
extractive political and economic institutions typically lead to economic stagnation and 
poverty in a country (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 91).    
 Since ethnic recognition and economic development are the two variables on which 
Rwanda and Burundi differ, it would not seem wrong to think that a combination of these 
variables can explain why there is a gap between the economic growth in these countries. 
 The thinking that ethnically-based politics is linked to exclusivity and the denial of 
ethnicity in politics is linked to inclusion is not expected to be seen here, because recognizing 
all ethnic groups would mean more inclusion for these groups in politics. According to 
Abbink (2011), a similar pattern was to be expected in Ethiopia after the political transition to 
ethno-federalism in 1991. The aim of this transition was that when politics was organized in 
line with the different ethnic groups, this would result in inclusive, non-discriminatory, issue-
based politics for the federation as a whole (Abbink, 2011, P. 598).  
 However, Ethiopia has become the vivid example that expected inclusive participation 
through ethnic-based politics does not always work in reality. Even though ethnic-based 
federalism was one of the core principles instituted by the post-1991 government in Ethiopia 
and the identities of previously non-dominant groups were constitutionally recognized and 
thought to stop the political dominance of a single ethnic group. The federalization, along 
ethnic division, has resulted in an increasingly authoritarian and extractive governance model, 
neglecting political liberties, respect for human rights and economic equality (Abbink, 2011, 
P. 596-597).            
 This reversed expectation of ethnized politics is exactly what can be seen happening in 
Burundi and Rwanda as well. The sharing of power under ethnic groups would have been 
expected to make the participation in politics more inclusive in Burundi, while in reality this 
ethnic power sharing has resulted in the discrimination and marginalization of minority 
groups, making institutions much more exclusive and extractive. In Rwanda, the non-
recognition attitude towards ethnicity would have been expected to make participation in 
politics more exclusive, but in reality, institutions and participation in Rwanda are much more 
inclusively organized. This is partly caused by the promotion of a common national identity 
in the constitution that guarantees equality and non-discrimination, and because the division 
of power is mainly based on competence and merit (Gilbert, 2013; Vandeginste, 2014). 
 If further evidence can be found that the attitude towards ethnicity - either the 
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recognition of ethnicity or the denial of ethnicity - determines the type of institutions that are 
formed in a country, the theory of Acemoglu and Robinson can be used to explain the relation 
between the type of institutions and the difference in economic growth that can be seen 
between Rwanda and Burundi. In order to verify if the recognition or denial of ethnicity can 
explain the difference in type of institutions in Rwanda and Burundi and confirm the theory of 
Acemoglu and Robinson about economic growth and institutions, the following research 
question has been formed; Why is it possible that two neighbouring countries, Rwanda and 
Burundi, that share a similar history and ethnic composition have different outcomes in 
economic development and how does the difference in ethnic recognition influence the 
economic growth of these countries in particular?       
 In order to answer the central question of this thesis, the qualitative case study method 
will be used in combination with a most similar systems design using data from journal 
articles, books and reports from different organizations like the World Bank, through 
observation and secondary document analysis.1 The method and design are chosen because 
the two cases that I chose as the objects of research are as similar as possible, except with 
regard to the phenomenon that both Rwanda and Burundi have incorporated ethnicity into 
their constitution in different ways and the fact that Rwanda and Burundi differ immensely 
when it comes to economic development. It is these effects that I am interested in assessing in 
this thesis (Anckar, 2008, P. 389).        
 To assess these effects, the thesis is organized as follows; first, the conceptualization 
and operationalization of inclusive and extractive institutions will be described in detail 
according to the theory of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). After this the similarities between 
Rwanda and Burundi will be explored in order to establish more historical context in chapter 
2, followed by how the attitude towards ethnicity is incorporated in the constitution and 
government policies in chapter 3. In chapter 4 and 5, evidence will be presented to prove that 
ethnic recognition has led to extractive institutions in Burundi and that the ethnic denial has 
led to inclusive institutions in Rwanda. After this, the mechanism that Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012) describe in their theory is then linked to the economic performance of both 
countries in chapter 6 and 7, to explain how the type of institution present have caused either 
economic growth or economic stagnation. 
                                                            
1 It should be noted here that attaining the exact same data for both Rwanda and Burundi was challenging, due to 
the limited amount of data to be found on Burundi on some matters, because of the ongoing conflict in the 
country. This has made the comparison between countries more limited in some places. 
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1. Economic growth and institutions 
To find out if the recognition or denial of ethnicity influences the type of institutions that are 
formed in Rwanda and Burundi, the types of institutions must be described in more detail. The 
definition and operationalization that Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) discuss in their book is 
chosen to do this since these types of institutions, either extractive or inclusive, are the core of 
their theory about the relationship between institutions and economic growth. Their theory is 
based on the idea that institutions influence behavior and incentives and can therefore forge the 
success or failure of a country (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 44). In short, they argue that 
economic growth is associated with inclusive political and economic institutions, while 
extractive political and economic institutions typically lead to economic stagnation and poverty 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 91).       
 The general mechanism that Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) include in their theory is 
that inclusive institutions provide an unbiased rule of law, which ensures property rights for the 
population. These property rights make sure that the belongings of the population are not taken 
from them, creating economic incentives to produce and make investments, which in turn 
facilitates sustainable economic growth. In order to understand how this mechanism works in 
more detail, the way Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) describe inclusive and extractive 
economic and political institutions must be further elaborated on.     
 Inclusive economic institutions are institutions that allow and encourage participation of 
the population in economic activities that make the best use of their skills and enables them to 
make the choices that they wish to make (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 74). To be inclusive, 
economic institutions must secure private property, a fair rule of law, permit the entry of new 
businesses and allow people to choose their careers. It must also make provisions for public 
services that provide a level playing field in which the population can exchange and contract. 
Nevertheless, the enforcing of property rights is one of the most important characteristics of 
inclusive economic institutions. Only the ones with these rights are willing to invest and 
increase productivity since these rights guarantee them that their property will not be taken 
away from them without any reason. If the majority of people in society are guaranteed all of 
these rights then these inclusive economic institutions can foster economic activity, 
productivity growth and economic prosperity (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 74-75). 
 The secure property rights, the rule of law, the provision of public services and the 
freedom to contract and exchange all rely on the state. The state is the institution with the 
coercive capacity to impose order, enforce contracts between private parties and prevent theft 
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and fraud. The degree of coordination that is needed to provide all of these things on a large 
scale can only be guaranteed by a central authority. The state is therefore inevitably intertwined 
with the economic institutions, as the enforcer of private property rights and contracts, rule of 
law and often as the key provider of public services, like health care, public infrastructure and 
education (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 74-75). Political institutions that are sufficiently 
centralized, pluralistic and can provide all the necessities mentioned above are referred to as 
inclusive political institutions. However, when either of these conditions fail, they refer to the 
institutions as extractive political institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 80-81).   
 These extractive political institutions concentrate power in the hands of a narrow elite 
and place few constraints on the exercise of this power. The economic institutions that can be 
found in the countries with extractive political institutions are often structured by the elite to 
extract resources from the rest of the society. The authors argue that these extractive economic 
institutions are naturally accompanied by extractive political institutions. This relationship 
introduces a strong feedback loop where political institutions enable the elite controlling 
political power to choose economic institutions with few opposing forces. This also enables the 
elite to structure future political institutions and their evolution. The extractive economic 
institutions that are suggested to be naturally accompanied by extractive political institutions, in 
turn, enrich the same elites to consolidate their political dominance and their economic wealth 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 81).       
 The consolidation of power, economic wealth and the extraction of resources from the 
many to the few, do not create nearly as much economic incentives as inclusive economic 
institutions in combination with inclusive political institutions do. Where inclusive economic 
institutions create inclusive markets, extractive economic institutions create the opposite and 
this is does not give people the freedom to pursue the calling in life that best suits their skills. It 
also fails to provide a level playing that can give them this opportunity and does not enforce 
property rights, which protects belongings and earnings from being taken from the alleged 
owner. This makes for little to no incentives to startup businesses and increase productivity 
when the resources are going straight back to the elite in power (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, 
P. 76-77).          
 Technological enhancements are almost always the supporter of sustainable economic 
growth, because these technological improvements are what enables people, land and existing 
capital to become more productive. It is therefore that inclusive economic institutions promote 
technology and education as the so-called engines of prosperity. Education is intimately linked 
to technology because in schools, at home and on the job, is where skills, competencies and the 
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know-how of the workforce are learned and acquired. Ultimately, a low education level is often 
caused by economic institutions that fail to create incentives for parents to let their children go 
to school and also by political institutions that fail to build, finance and support schools 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 77-78).       
 Economic growth and technological change are usually accompanied by something that 
Acemoglu and Robinson call creative destruction, which simply means replacing the old with 
something new. Fear of this creative destruction process is often at the root of the opposition to 
inclusive economic and political institutions and it is mostly the elite in power under extractive 
political and economic institutions that form the opposition against this process and see creative 
destruction as a threat to their economic and political power (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 
84-85).          
 Nonetheless, the economic and political institutions are not always static, they are prone 
to change when a critical juncture occurs. Acemoglu and Robinson describe a critical juncture 
as a major event or confluence of factors that can disrupt the existing economic or political 
balance in a society. They compare a critical juncture to a double-edged sword that can cause a 
sharp turn in the trajectory of a nation. It can break the cycle of extractive institutions in a 
country and enable more inclusive ones to emerge or it can intensify the emergence of 
extractive institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 101).     
 The type of institutions countries have, can therefore be influenced by an important 
event in time that either enables a completely other type of institutions to emerge or to intensify 
the current type of institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 101). How Rwanda and 
Burundi chose their constitutions to be led by their attitude towards ethnicity after the civil war 
in Burundi and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, can therefore in my opinion be seen as a critical 
juncture that has influenced the type of institutions that were formed in these countries. From 
this on out, these types of institutions have controlled whether economic success can be seen in 
a country or not.          
 Before this thesis continues to show if the difference in ethnic recognition between 
Rwanda and Burundi can explain the difference in the type of institutions and the mechanism 
underlying the theory of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) can explain how these types of 
institutions can explain the occurrence of either economic growth or stagnation, the similarities 
between the countries are explored. This is done in order to show why it is relevant to find out 
what causes the difference in economic development and clarify the historical context. 
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2. Similarities between Rwanda and Burundi. 
As mentioned in the introduction, Rwanda and Burundi share quite a few characteristics and 
similarities. First of all, both countries have got a similar ethnic composition, where the Hutu 
make up 85 percent of the population, the Tutsi make up 14 percent of the population and the 
Twa or Batwa make up just 1 percent of the population (CIA World Factbook, 2018ab). 
Continuing with the historical similarities, both countries have experienced colonialism, they 
were first colonialized by Germany from 1897 to 1916, but after the first World War, they were 
joined as one territory called Ruanda-Urundi by Belgium as part of the mandate under the 
League of Nations (Vandeginste, 2014, P. 264). They both gained independence on 1 July 1962 
and since gaining their independence both countries have been dominated by mono-ethnic 
single-party regimes that have permitted discrimination and genocidal ideologies to exist.  
 Coup d’états were used in both countries to obtain changes in the political leadership, 
with the consequence of a turbulent political history where the power of the state was in hands 
of one single ethnic group at the time, the Hutus in Rwanda and the Tutsis in Burundi (Daley, 
2009, P. 167). According to Daley (2009), leaders from these specific ethnic groups have 
systematically prevented people belonging to the other ethnic groups from accessing state 
institutions and resources, and discrimination and repression have resulted in uprisings and 
conflict.           
 Both countries have experienced a violent transition of regimes following the failure of 
democratization processes in the early 1990’s and the mobilization of ethnicity in politics was a 
major driver of internal armed conflict (Vandeginste, 2014, P. 263). In Rwanda, this resulted in 
a civil war led by the RPF movement in October 1990, which ended in July 1994 when this 
same movement defeated the government forces and Hutu militia and stopped the genocide 
which cost lives of many Tutsis and Hutus. Respectively, civil war in Burundi started after the 
assassination of Hutu President Ndadaye on 21 October 1993. Burundi was the scene of civil 
war for nearly fifteen years, resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths during clashes 
between the Tutsi government forces and Hutu rebel movements. After these bloody conflicts, 
both countries started to change with the implementation of new constitutions and both 
countries incorporated the recognition of ethnicity in different ways.    
 The attitude that the two countries have towards the incorporation of ethnicity and 
ethnic groups is very different when you compare them to each other. Even though they share 
the same ethnic composition of Hutu, Tutsi and Batwa people, how they treat ethnicity could 
not be more different. To find out if the recognition or denial of ethnicity produces either 
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extractive or inclusive institutions, it is important to understand how both countries handle 
ethnicity first. (Vandeginste, 2014, P. 266).  
 
3. The recognition of ethnicity and institutions 
As mentioned, both countries have implemented new constitutions after they went through 
major periods of ethnic conflict and war. After long transition periods, Rwanda attained a new 
constitution in 2003 and Burundi in 2005. They both have had very different approaches to how 
they addressed ethnicity in these new constitutions, from the absolute ban on the use of ethnic 
markers in Rwanda to a carefully crafted ethnical power sharing agreement in Burundi (Gilbert, 
2013, P. 417). To see if the attitude towards ethnicity - the non-recognition in Rwanda and the 
recognition in Burundi - have contributed to the totally different kinds of institutions in both 
countries, we need to take a closer look at both of their new constitutions.  
 First Rwanda, in contrast to the close link between ethnicity and constitutionalism prior 
to the Rwandan constitution of 2003, the new constitution rejects any mention of ethnicity. In 
its preamble written after a nine-year long transition period, the government is determined to 
eradicate all ethnic division. It also aims at promoting national unity by the exclusion of any 
concept of ethnicity (Gilbert, 2013, P. 418). Consequently, this resulted in article 126 which 
notes that public servants shall be recruited and promoted on the basis of merit and competence 
(Vandeginste, 2014, P. 269).          
 The strongest element in the constitution supporting the non-recognition of ethnicity in 
the constitution of the country can be found in article 54 which prohibits the association 
between ethnicity and political parties, and in short states that political organizations are not 
allowed to be based on race, religion, ethnic groups and more that may provoke discrimination 
of minorities. The reason behind this philosophy is that any reference to ethnicity may create 
division and goes against the policy of unity and reconciliation in the country. Not only does 
the constitution ban any recognition of ethnicity in political parties, association or religious 
groups, it also expresses the strong favor of equality and non-discrimination in Rwanda.  
 To sum up, the new constitution supports any official policy as long as there is a total 
eradication of anything having to do with ethnic identification and is no threat to the unity of 
the country (Gilbert, 2013, P. 418-419).        
 Where Rwanda chose for a complete eradication of the recognition of ethnicity in its 
political and legal affairs that are included in its constitution, Burundi moved towards a whole 
different design of ethnical recognition. They have opted for power sharing with the aim of 
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establishing a political and legal balance between the ethnic groups that live within the borders 
making Burundi’s 2005 constitution a framework that is based explicitly on the recognition of 
ethnicity and minority rights (Gilbert, 2013, P. 422).       
 The preamble of Burundi’s 2005 constitution establishes the protection and the 
inclusion of all the ethnic, religious and cultural minority groups that live within the border. It 
also affirms the need for a change in the justice systems and better national security for all who 
live in the country, including ethnic minorities. In the first article of the constitution, it is 
claimed that Burundi is an independent and sovereign, secular, democratic, unitary republic, 
that respects its ethnic and religious diversity. However, the main focus of the constitution is 
about how the power sharing arrangement and therefore the recognition of ethnicity actually 
works according to the technical aspects.         
 The arrangement guarantees the proportional representation on national and local level 
to all ethnic groups that live in Burundi. It also prescribes that the National Assembly should be 
composed of 60 percent Hutus and 40 percent Tutsis, these quotas are also used in the 
administration of Burundi. The smallest ethnic group, the Twa (Batwa) community are given 
three seats in the National Assembly and three seats in the senate (Gilbert, 2013, P. 422-423).
 This institutionalized ethnicity as criteria for participation in politics is completely 
different than the approach of Rwanda, where merit, integrity and competence are the criteria 
for everyone, independent of which ethnic group they belong to (Vandeginste, 2014, P. 269). 
         
4. Rwanda, ethnic amnesia and inclusive institutions.  
Where the policy of the eradication of ethnicity in the constitution in Rwanda would have 
expected to decrease the inclusion of minority groups. The new constitution as the result of a 
nine-year transition period, in contrast, aims at promoting national unity by the eradication of 
ethnic, regional and other divisions (Gilbert, 2013, P. 418). Besides the policy of national unity 
being based on ethnic amnesia, the inclusion of the whole population is also promoted by 
citizenship referred to as ‘Rwandan-ness’ (Vandeginste, 2014, P. 269).   
 This policy based on ethnic amnesia and the integrationist view centered around civic 
identity have resulted in legislative elections that are based on proportionality, in which 
regional origin and representativeness are considered to be irrelevant electorally. 
Proportionality in this case refers to the electoral system in which the number of seats of a 
particular party reflects the number of votes that are won, it does not refer to the ethnic or 
regional representation as it does in Burundi (Vandeginste, 2014, P. 270).  
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 A quota for the composition of parliament has also been written into the Rwandan 
constitution, promoting even more inclusion of minority groups. Of the eighty members in 
parliament, twenty-four of them must be female, one member is chosen by the national youth 
council and one member is chosen by the national council of persons with disabilities. In 
addition to this, Rwanda takes pride in favouring power-sharing and seeking solutions through 
consensus and dialogue. The power-sharing in the Rwandan context means that the president 
and the speaker of the chamber of deputies do not belong to the same political party. It also 
refers to the rule that one political party, even if it has achieved a majority in the chamber of 
deputies, cannot claim more than half of the ministers in cabinet in the coalition government. 
This meaning of power-sharing in Rwanda has nothing to do with Burundi’s ethnic power-
sharing agreement (Vandeginste, 2014, P. 270).       
 The political institutions in Rwanda can be called pluralistic according to the definition 
that pluralistic power must be distributed broadly in society and subject to constraints 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 80). The distribution of power spread broadly in society can 
be seen in the decentralization policy. The decentralization policy has distributed power to the 
lower levels of government and has helped to democratize leadership and create platforms for 
groups, like youth and women, which had been excluded from governance in the past 
(Rwandan Ministry of Local Government, 2012, P. 6).       
 The rule of law and good governance were both points included in the Rwanda Vision 
2020, a report that outlines the long-term development path of Rwanda. It states that the 
country is committed to being a capable state, characterized by a rule of law that supports and 
protects all its citizens. It also states that the state will ensure good governance, meaning a state 
that is respectful of democratic processes and to the rule of law. The overview report assembled 
by the HIIL institute (2012, P. 11) states that when it comes to the rule of law, there are 
certainly some positive trends to be seen in Rwanda. These trends entail a positive policy 
towards corruption, which is almost unheard of in Rwanda. It also argues that the justice 
system has made impressive steps towards improvement and so does the infrastructure of 
courts and tribunals, with laws and regulation available on the internet in three languages. The 
fairness of criminal trials and the access to justice are positive trends that can be seen in 
Rwanda as well.           
 Political institutions are called inclusive according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, P. 
80-81) when the institutions are sufficiently centralized, pluralistic and can ensure necessities 
like an unbiased rule of law and property rights. The policies in the constitution and institutions 
that were shaped by the ethnic amnesia attitude in Rwanda have succeeded in providing a 
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central authority and a pluralistic state with the capacity to ensure the necessities like an 
unbiased rule of law, an effective judiciary and property rights. Institutions in Rwanda can 
therefore be called inclusive. How these inclusive political institutions that were formed have 
influenced the economic growth in Rwanda is further elaborated on in chapter 6. 
 
5. Burundi, ethnic recognition and extractive institutions.  
Even though it is evident that Rwanda and Burundi have very different institutional 
characteristics when it comes to ethnicity, the power-sharing agreement after the Arusha 
accords would have been expected to contribute to more inclusion of minorities in Burundi, as 
was mentioned in the introduction. In reality, this is not the case, since the power-sharing 
agreement has resulted in the discrimination and the marginalization of ethnic minorities 
(Abbink, 2011, Gilbert, 2013; Vandeginste, 2014).        
 The power sharing arrangement which was negotiated during Burundi’s peace process 
may have saved the pluralistic nature of the elections, but has also fallen victim to these same 
pluralistically natured elections. This happened when the dominant party CNDD-FDD obtained 
an overwhelming majority win in parliament and from there on out controlled most of the 
instruments needed to establish a hegemony or rule of their own (Vandeginste, 2011, P. 315). 
 The 2015 election crisis, caused by the controversial third term win for the Burundian 
president Nkurunziza, has led to criticism towards the ethnic quotas that the Burundi 
government works with in their institutions. The Hutu population are unhappy by the 
overrepresentation of the Tutsi, while the Tutsi argue that ethnic affiliation often outweighs 
merit, although in practice it is not just ethnic affiliation, but also the loyalty to the ruling party 
(BTI Country Report 2018).            
 This resulted in President Nkurunziza and his immediate entourage effectively 
governing the country in what can be called an authoritarian kind of way, without any check 
and balances and where democratic inclusive institutions are hollowed out by a small ruling 
elite as well as the military (BTI Country Report, 2018, P. 7).  The power-sharing framework 
has thus been unable to prevent a one-party government from happening, causing fundamental 
issues like an even greater gap between rich and poor, gender inequality, corruption, clientelism 
and oppression to become reality in Burundi (BTI Country Report, 2018, P. 16).   
 The characteristics that fit extractive institutions have become more evident because of 
this. Acemoglu and Robinson call institutions extractive when power is concentrated in the 
hands of a narrow elite that tries to consolidate this power. These extractive institutions are not 
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sufficiently centralized, pluralistic and cannot provide necessities like an unbiased rule of law, 
property rights and an effective judiciary for example (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 80-81). 
Even though the CNDD-FDD makes it seem like they are the central authority, the way the 
party is controlling the state institutions at all levels with an iron fist, democratic efforts, 
political consensus, pluralism and respect for human rights, that were incorporated into the 
constitution all have ceased to exist (BTI Country Report, 2018, P. 3).     
 Where trends in Rwanda were heading towards a positive direction when it comes to the 
rule of law, Burundi is still far from reaching positive trends in general. Burundi is called one 
of the most corrupt countries in the region making it no surprise that the government and the 
services that they provide are often under the suspicion of cronyism. This suspicion is 
confirmed by procedures that are usually conducted in a non-transparent way and the taking of 
bribes by government officials which is often reported (Index of Economic Freedom, 2018, P. 
125). According to the anti-corruption civil society organization ‘Transparency International’ 
in their corruption perception index of 2017, Burundi is ranked 157th most corrupt out of 180 
countries. (Nininahazwe, February 2018).         
 The judiciary, of which Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, P. 329) argue can undermine 
the balance of power in the system that protects against anyone from taking too much power in 
hands and ensures the continuity of pluralistic political institutions, is set up as a separated 
institution that should be operating independently from all other organs of the state in Burundi. 
However, judicial appointments are made by the government and the president and increasing 
political pressure is exerted on the judicial system. In general, the judiciary that should be 
independent of the Burundi government bends completely to the will of the executive power 
(BTI Country Report, 2018, P. 12-13).         
 Furthermore, there is an increasing politicization of the courts, because of the extreme 
political response from the courts against the opposition and politicians that show minor 
support for the current government. Members of the lower levels of the judiciary system are 
poorly equipped and trained for their function and the entire judicial system is prone to cases of 
corruption. The recent decision of the Burundi government to withdraw from the Rome statute, 
has too made the provision of justice a distant prospect for many Burundi citizens (BTI 
Country Report, 2018, P. 13).         
 Inclusivity of politics causes voices and demands of minority groups to be included and 
considered in decision making in parliament, but if we look at Burundi, this is certainly not the 
case. Even though women have had the right to vote and to be elected since the beginning of 
elections in 1961, politics in Burundi have traditionally been overwhelmed by men, with the 
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exception of one female minster between 1993 and 1994. The role that women play has been 
traditionally limited to the domestic sphere and therefore their political participation has been 
minimal (UNDP, 2014, P. 6).        
 Since the democratically elected government came in to power in Burundi in 2005, the 
government did implement a decentralization process in the hope of increasing the social 
cohesion, improve local governance and strengthen the infrastructure and public services in 
rural communities. This was done because most conflict was caused by the marginalization of 
these rural communities, where power both political and economic was in hands of the urban 
elites. However, with the CNDD- FDD controlling all levels of state-institutions, the efforts of 
the 2005 government have been eradicated. (The World Bank, 2014; BTI Country Report 
2018).             
 The challenges that include the absence of institutions that are critical for a democratic 
transition, the lack of property rights and the biased rule of law. As well as the lack of free 
press and many violations of human rights within the border, all contribute to the phenomenon 
of extractive institutions in Burundi (Ndimurwimo & Mboa, 2014, P. 1097). 
 
6. Inclusive institutions and economic growth in Rwanda. 
The denial of ethnicity in the constitution and government policies that Rwanda has adopted 
after the 1994 genocide have led to institutions that can be called inclusive by the standards of 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). In order to test if their theory, in which economic growth can 
be achieved by institutions that are inclusive, the mechanism underlying this theory must be 
applied to the case of Rwanda.         
 Sustainable economic growth can be attained if the inclusive economic institutions 
allow and encourage the participation in economic activities by the population that makes the 
best use of their skills and enables them to make the choices that they wish to make (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2012, P. 74).          
 The enforcing of property rights is a crucial in creating economic incentives, because 
when property rights are secured by the government, the population is given the incentives to 
invest their money and increase productivity, without their property being taken away from 
them (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 75). In Rwanda, the law protects and facilitates the 
acquisition and the disposition of all property rights (Index of Economic Freedom, 2018, P. 
349). Investors involved in commercial agriculture, which makes up a huge part of the 
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economy, have leasehold titles and are able to secure their property titles. Foreign investors 
also have the rights to own private property and acquire real estate, which attracts foreign 
investments (The Rwanda office of investment affairs, 2017).     
 Next to property rights, inclusive economic institutions must also permit the entry of 
new businesses and allow people to choose their careers, as well as make provisions for public 
services to provide a level playing field, making it more attractive for people to exchange and 
contract (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, P. 75-76).     
 Over the last couple of years, Rwanda has implemented several reforms to make it 
easier to do business in the country, which has especially impacted the small and medium sized 
enterprises. Among these reforms are the improvement of the construction permit process, the 
online payment of taxes and the progress tracking of applications for permits through email and 
SMS (Mwai, November 2017).         
 Rwanda is making big leaps in the provision of public services, especially in health care 
and education. These two provisions are important for economic growth to be seen because 
when someone is not in good health, they are not fit enough to work. Without sufficient 
education, people are not given the opportunity to reach their vocation in life and the unknown 
skills and talents of a large number of individuals may be missed, when they could have been 
the next Albert Einstein or Bill Gates (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 78-79).    
 Over the past 15 years, Rwanda has built a near-universal health care system that covers 
more than 90 percent of the population, financed by tax revenue, foreign aid and voluntary 
premiums scaled by income. It is not yet as perfect as the health system in Denmark, but access 
to health care has improved substantially and the financial burden it imposes on Rwandan 
people has declined. This improved health care has resulted in more than 97 percent of the 
infants vaccinated against several types of diseases, like hepatitis B and Polio, as well as a drop 
in infant mortality by almost three-quarters since 2000 (Porter, July 2017).    
 Looking at the investment in education, Rwanda is one of the top-performing countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thanks to efforts made by the government and its partners, like 
UNICEF, the country has even achieved Millennium Development Goal two; access to 
universal primary education, with an enrolment of almost 98 percent. When it comes to gender 
equality in education, the education system in Rwanda has the highest participation rates in 
East-Africa and the girls’ enrolment on all school levels surpasses that of boy’s enrollment 
(UNICEF, 2018).  
 Creative destruction and technological change too is a needed for sustainable economic 
growth, because this is what enables people and existing capital to become more productive 
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(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 84-85). In Rwanda, this is seen by targets that are set for 
improving the access of electricity and the telecommunications network through the country. 
Rwanda is targeting 100 percent access to electricity by the year 2024 and based on the data of 
the government of Rwanda, current national electrification rate has reaches 41%, still leaving 
over seven million people lacking in the access to electricity (Power Africa, March 2018). By 
working together with the private sector in implementing the electricity strategy, focus will be 
on the increasing competition within the private sector reducing costs and improving the supply 
of technology on the market (Rwandan Ministry of Infrastructure, 2016, P. 1).   
 The government has also made big investments in the telecommunications network 
across the country, which attracts more electronic commerce and business process outsourcing. 
The percentage of people carrying mobile phones has even increased from 6 percent in 2006 to 
45.2 percent in 2011 (Crisafulli & Redmond, 2012, P. 9-10).     
 The state does not just intertwine in infrastructure and telecommunications, there is a 
major focus on agriculture as part of Rwandan’s development too. Several modern faring 
techniques have been introduced to local farmers, including new irrigation techniques and 
machines like tractors and ploughs. Besides new techniques, the government also subsidizes 
fertilizer and distributes it through the private sector networks, supporting both farmers and 
private sector businesses (Crisafulli & Redmond, 2012, P. 135-136).    
 The property rights, easier access for businesses to the market and the facilitation 
sufficient healthcare, education and technology all are the result of the inclusive economic 
institutions that can be found in Rwanda. These inclusive economic institutions are determined 
by the inclusive political institutions that were formed after the new constitution was adopted in 
2003 and explain the economic success that is seen in Rwanda over the last couple years. This 
transition towards more inclusive economic institutions that generate economic development, 
especially the growing economic freedom and the enforcement of property rights, attract more 
foreign investors to Rwanda that see opportunities in the growing economy, securing Rwanda 
of economic growth in the future to come (Sipangule, March 2017).   
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7. Extractive institutions and poor economic performance in Burundi. 
The state is inevitably intertwined with economic institutions, as the enforcer of private 
property rights and contracts, rule of law and often as the key provider of public services like 
healthcare and education. The state is the institution that has the coercive capacity to impose 
order and enforce contracts between private parties. However, the degree of coordination that is 
needed to provide all these crucial aspects on a large scale and facilitate economic growth can 
only be guaranteed by a central authority (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 74-75).  
 This central authority that needs to provide property rights, rule of law and public 
services cannot be seen in Burundi at most. The poor economic performance that is seen in 
Burundi at the moment and over the last couple years might be caused by this. To determine if 
the extractive institutions, which includes insufficient central authority, can explain the poor 
economic performance, the mechanism that Acemoglu and Robinson argue stops countries 
from achieving economic growth must be tested.       
 Since the crisis that broke out after the 2015 elections in Burundi, the capacity of the 
state that needs to be able to enforce law and order, regulate economic activity, provide public 
goods and facilitate the private sector has left a lot to be desired for. Essential provisions that 
create economic incentives are not seen nearly as much as in Rwanda.     
 The enforcement of property rights might be one of the most important provisions that 
must be made by the state to create economic incentives for people to invest, increase 
productivity and trade (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 75). Nevertheless, the lack of the 
enforcement of property rights provided by the government has made it necessary for people 
and businesses to step into the informal sector. Although private property can be registered, it is 
vulnerable to armed banditry and there is a risk of the government claiming or seizing it 
without question (Index of Economic Freedom, 2018, P. 125).     
 Next to the insufficient securing of property rights by the government, the access of 
businesses to the market is made more deterring by the overregulation and inefficiency of 
administrational activity. This makes obtaining electricity, paying taxes, attaining permits, 
enforcing contracts and registering poverty a tiresome and complicated process, which does not 
at all contribute to further economic incentives to trade and invest. While the financial sector in 
the country is dominated by banks, less than one percent of the entire population has access to 
loans, which could have been used to start businesses with. (Index of Economic Freedom, 
2018, P. 124-125).             
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 Where Rwanda does provide basic public services which Acemoglu and Robinson 
argue are a must for political inclusive institutions in order to achieve economic prosperity on 
the long-term. The providing of basic public services, like access to electricity and good 
infrastructure that crucial for trade, is not as rewarding in Burundi. As is the quality of health 
care, which is still insufficient. Access to health care is mostly constrained by the lack of 
resources and the high costs of the services. To fix the high health care cost and the growing 
malnutrition problem that the country faces, money is the most important factor. Yet this is a 
continuing problem since the financing for health care has been cut back with 54 percent since 
a budget decrease in 2016 (World Food Programme, 2017, P. 7).     
 Thanks to foreign aid, many primary school in the rural communities have been either 
rebuilt or expanded. The quality of these schools on the other hand is still very low and teachers 
in the primary schools are still underpaid and underequipped to teach properly. This results in 
frequent teacher strikes and many boarding schools closing, mostly due to lack of resources 
that are provided by the government. After the constitutional crisis in 2015 and the financial 
withdrawal of donors that followed this crisis, the government has made it clear that they rather 
cut down the education budget than to negotiate with donors (BTI Country Report, 2018, P. 
10). However, it is not all bad in Burundi, there is some progress in improving primary school 
enrolment and almost 97 percent of the children are enrolled in primary school, boys and girls 
alike, the completion of this primary level, nevertheless, is falling short on set targets and only 
32 percent of all children complete secondary education, in which boys outnumber girls 10 to 7 
in ratio (World Food Programme, 2017, P. 6).      
 Fear of creative destruction and technological change is often at the root of extractive 
institutions, because it endangers the economic and political power of the current elite. This 
could be the reason why public infrastructure like the provision of electricity and energy lacks 
behind Rwanda. In Burundi, about 99 percent of the rural households use biomass for cooking, 
for which firewood is by far the dominant source of energy. The resulting deforestation and 
indoor air pollution are worsened by these inefficient technologies. Regardless of this, the 
potential of renewable energy in the country is considerable, but largely unused (Energizing 
Development, 2018).          
 Despite the energy sector being one of the key sectors of the countries’ economy, only 
1,8 percent of the population has access to electricity and the majority of electricity is 
consumed in only two cities. In order to improve the energy sector, the country needs projects 
to develop its energy potential and the increasing technical problems that keep appearing in the 
electricity grid (Fortune of Africa, 2018). The research expenditures are very low and largely 
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externally financed, making modern research and development activities practically non-
existent in Burundi (BTI Country Report, 2018, P. 27). This might also be the reason why there 
is almost no innovation and investment in renewable resources, even though this could put the 
country on the map economically and environmentally.       
 The reclining openness to foreign investment makes it unattractive for foreign 
companies and businesses to invest in Burundi’s economy, even though investors now mostly 
stay away because of the conflicts, investors also stay away because of the great public debts 
that makes up 47.2 percent of the GDP of Burundi, which has increased to 26.7 percent of the 
total output of the GDP (Index of Economic Freedom, 2018, P. 124-125).   
 It is therefore clear that the capacity of the pluralistic state, that must be able to enforce 
the rule of law, property rights, economic incentives for people to trade and uphold contracts, 
and facilitate public services to take care of the population is very weak in Burundi. Without all 
these factors, economic incentives are not created for people to invest and increase 
productivity. Creative destruction, technological advancement and property rights are not 
facilitated by the extractive economic institutions, which inarguably leads to the poor economic 
performance that can be seen in Burundi.  
 
8. Conclusion. 
To conclude, surprising economic growth in Rwanda and poor economic performance in 
Burundi can be seen in Africa’s Great Lake region, even though the countries share borders, a 
geographical lay-out, historical background and ethnic composition. This is caused by the type 
of institution – inclusive institutions in Rwanda and extractive institutions in Burundi – that 
were formed this way by the denial of ethnicity in Rwandan politics and the recognition of 
ethnicity in Burundian politics.        
 Although the recognition of ethnicity in Burundi and the denial of Ethnicity in Rwanda 
was expected to have resulted in more inclusion of ethnic minorities in Burundi and exclusion 
of ethnic minorities in Rwanda, just like Abbink (2011) expected to happen in Ethiopia when 
ethno-federalism was set-up to stop the exclusion of ethnic minorities. The recognition of 
ethnicity in Burundi is believed to have intensified the already extractive political and 
economic institutions in the country after the critical juncture of the civil war, rather than 
breaking the cycle of extractive institutions and enabling more inclusive ones to emerge 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, P. 101). Consequently, the denial of ethnicity in Rwanda is 
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believed to have broken the cycle of extractive institutions after the critical juncture of civil war 
and the 1994 genocide and has enabled more inclusive institutions to emerge (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012, P. 101).          
 To explain the difference in economic growth, the theory of Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2012) was chosen over the theory of Easterly and Levine (1997), because ethnic diversity of 
which Easterly and Levine (2012) argue causes poor economic growth, is not evident enough in 
Rwanda and Burundi, with just three different ethnic groups. The theory of Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012) was also chosen because the recognition of ethnicity has been incorporated in 
several important institutions, like the constitution.       
 In short, the mechanism in the theory of the authors entails that inclusive political 
institutions take care of an unbiased rule of law, that secures property rights. The property 
rights create economic incentives for the population to produce and make investments and 
when this continues, economic growth and prosperity are the result. However, when there is a 
bias rule of law and the property rights are not ensured, the population are not given the 
incentives to produce and invest. This usually indicates that the political and economic 
institutions in a country are extractive.         
 In Rwanda, the inclusive political institutions that were formed by the denial of 
ethnicity, take care of an unbiased rule of law, secure property rights and facilitate public 
services. This has created economic incentives for people to invest and increase productivity, 
resulting in economic growth.         
 In contrast to Rwanda, the extractive institutions that were held in place by the 
recognition of ethnicity after the civil war in Burundi do not contribute to an unbiased rule of 
law. The bias rule of law, together with insufficient property rights and poor facilitation of 
public services does not motivate people to make investment and to increase their productivity, 
resulting in poor economic growth.         
 To sum up, evidence can be found that the type of institutions that were formed after the 
critical juncture of the civil war in Burundi and the civil war resulting in genocide in Rwanda, 
were the result of whether ethnicity was recognized in both countries. The type of institutions – 
inclusive institutions in Rwanda and extractive institutions in Burundi – in turn can explain the 
gap in economic growth confirming the theory of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). 
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